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Erich Herbermann*
Introduction
Every ten years the process of redrawing state congressional and legislative district maps
occurs to revise boundaries to ensure each district has an equal population. Though the
redistricting process differs between most states, the resulting maps are usually challenged in the
courts. Recent redistricting cycles have earned Maryland the distinction as being one of the most
gerrymandered states in the country. In Maryland, the Democrat led legislature has the last say in
both the approval of congressional and legislative redistricting maps which has led to
gerrymandering issues. When the redistricting process is viewed as partisan, and the resulting
maps are viewed as gerrymandered, citizens feel they are being cheated out of the ability to have
meaningful representation. It’s critical to restore faith in the redistricting process and provide a
system that ensures more neutral/nonpartisan maps are drawn. Other states, including Colorado,
California, and Michigan, have reformed their redistricting processes to put independent
bipartisan commissions in charge of redrawing neutral district maps. Maryland should look to
these states processes and constitutional language to better address its own gerrymandering
issues. The first step in this process for Maryland would be giving citizens the opportunity to
vote on a ballot measure to amend the state Constitution language regarding the redistricting
process for both state and legislative districts to mandate the use of independent bipartisan
commissions to draw and issue into law district maps. This revised redistricting process would
provide more neutral outcomes by diminishing partisan influence of political parties and special
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interests. Additionally, this would prevent a legislature controlled by one party from bypassing
the will of the people.
Given the political importance of redistricting, there are those that strongly support
reform and those that do not.1 Most redistricting processes are controlled by the state legislature
which every ten years redraws the state’s district lines out of self-interest to create “safe” seats
that can ensure reelection.2 The struggle between the partisans in the majority trying to keep
power, and the partisans in the minority interested in resetting the balance of power, is the
situation we find in Maryland’s current legislative system.
Part I of this article briefly discusses the current redistricting system used in Maryland as
well as past attempts at reforming the state’s redistricting process. Part II will explore the
redistricting processes that have been reformed in California, Colorado, and Michigan. Part III
provides an analysis of where the Maryland system fails, as well as a comparison of the
redistricting systems implemented in California, Colorado, and Michigan. This section will also
explore possible solutions to Maryland’s redistricting issues based on what worked in other
states that have implemented independent redistricting commission and used them to ameliorate
gerrymandering. Finally, Part IV provides a summary of the findings of this article.
I.

Maryland redistricting

The term redistricting is used to define the process by which congressional and state
legislative district boundaries are drawn. These boundaries are redrawn every ten years after
completion of the United States Census. In this section I describe the current legislative and
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Angelo N. Ancheta, Redistricting Reform and the California Citizens Redistricting Commission , 8 HARV. L. REV.
109, 109-10 (2014).
2 Id.
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congressional redistricting process in Maryland as well as what recent reform efforts have
occurred and resulting litigation.
A. The Current Process
The current redistricting system in Maryland provides two distinct processes for drawing
legislative and congressional maps.3 The legislative redistricting process requires the Governor
to submit proposed plans at the start of the legislative session. 4 Once plans are submitted, the
legislature may adopt, modify, or ignore the Governor’s proposed plans.5 If the state legislature
does not successfully pass a joint resolution (without the possibility of a gubernational veto) to
redraw the state legislative lines within forty-five days, the Governor’s plan becomes law.6 The
congressional redistricting process charges the legislature with drawing new congressional maps
which are submitted to the Governor for approval. 7 If the Governor vetoes the proposed maps,
the legislature can override that veto with a three-fifths vote from the elected membership of
both chambers.8
B. Recent Reform Efforts
On January 1, 2021, Governor Larry Hogan issued an executive order establishing a
Citizens Redistricting Commission, which he put in charge of drawing fair legislative and
congressional maps for Maryland for the 2022 elections.9 The commission consisted of nine

3

Redistricting Systems: A 50-State Overview, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES , (March 3, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-systems-a-50-state-overview.aspx.
4 Id.
5 M D. C ONST . art. III, § 5.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Joanne Antoine, Governor Hogan Announces Citizens Redistricting Commission, C OMMON C AUSE M ARYLAND,
(January 1, 2021), https://www.commoncause.org/maryland/press-release/governor-hogan-announces-citizensredistricting-commission/.
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members: three Republicans, three Democrats and three independents.10 Through his executive
order, the Governor gets to appoint three of the nine members. These three members must
include one member from the Republican party, one member from the Democratic party and one
independent member. The remaining six commission member positions are filled via a public
application process wherein two members registered with the Democratic party, two members
registered with the Republican party, and two independent commission members are selected. 11
The selection of members is intended to produce a commission independent from legislative
influence and reasonably representative of the state’s geographical, racial and gender makeup.12
Governor Hogan presented the nine independent commission members on April 15, 2021. 13 Both
the legislative and congressional maps drawn by the independent commission were presented to
the public for comment, and then submitted to the legislature for approval. 14 Both maps were
rejected and replaced with maps drawn by the legislature.
Similar results have been witnessed in New York’s attempt to create an independent
redistricting commission to draw that state’s maps in 2021. New York’s redistricting commission
was comprised of five Republicans and five Democrats.15 In New York, the legislature was able
to bypass the commission after a deadlock prevented the commission from coming to an
agreement on the state’s legislative and congressional maps.16 The legislature drawn maps gave
Democrats a huge advantage in the state and was approved along partisan lines which resulted in
10

Id.
Id.
12 Id.
13 Bennett Leckrone, Hogan’s Redistricting Commission Announces Members, M ARYLAND M ATTERS (April 15,
2021), https://www.marylandmatters.org/2021/04/15/hogans-redistricting-commission-announces-members/
14 https://wtop.com/maryland/2021/10/in-maryland-2-separate-redistricting-commissions-look-to-redraw-thelegislative-map/.
15 Jon Campbell, “Designed To Fail”- NY’s Redistricting Mess Was A Decade In The Making, GOTHAMIST
(February 3, 2022), https://gothamist.com/news/designed-to-fail-nys-redistricting-mess-was-a-decade-in-themaking.
16 Id.
11
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an increase of three Democratic leaning seats, a decrease of three Republican leaning seats and a
decrease of one highly competitive seat from the old map.17 On May 3, 2022, the New York
Court of Appeals struck down the congressional redistricting map drawn and previously enacted
by the legislature on April 27, 2022.18 The Court required the map to be redrawn with the
assistance of a neutral expert.19 The lack of authority granted to the New York redistricting
commission resulted in the egregiously biased maps. 20
If the legislature can bypass the commission’s maps, then the commission is not truly
independent. Commissions like those used in Maryland and New York that lack autonomy and
instead require the approval of the legislature are known as Advisory Commissions.21 The main
issue with these Advisory Commissions is that elected officials still retain the power to adopt or
reject the proposed new district lines.22 These redistricting commissions haven’t been made truly
independent and even when they keep legislative partisans off the commissions, the political
creatures can still attack the process. Independent redistricting commissions offer a better model
for mapping states political representation than letting incumbents choose their voters. They just
need to build a strong system that keeps the self-interested politicians from sabotaging the
process.

17

Id.
WHAT REDISTRICTING LOOKS LIKE IN EVERY STATE, https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/redistricting-2022maps/new-york/ (last visited 5/2/2022).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J.. 1808, 1813-15 (2012)
22 Id.
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C. Resulting Litigation
On February 19, 2022, the group called Fair Maps Maryland filed suit, challenging both
the congressional and legislative maps that the Maryland legislature had issued into law.23 On
March 25, 2022, Maryland Senior Judge Lynne Battaglia agreed with the plaintiffs’ arguments
that the congressional map violated the state Constitution's equal protection guarantee, among
other provisions, by diluting Republican voters' electoral power. The Judge ruled the district
lines overwhelmingly favored the Democratic party in violation of the state Constitution and
ordered lawmakers to draw a new plan by March 30, 2022.24 The delay in adopting a final
congressional map has delayed the state’s primary election and left both campaigns and voters in
limbo.25 On April 4, 2022, Governor Hogan approved the newly submitted congressional map
drawn by the Democrat controlled legislature.

26

The new map will most likely result in a

congressional delegation that will look a lot like the current one. 27 Unfortunately the new maps
maintain the partisan status quo. They contrast to the more neutral maps drawn by the Citizens
Redistricting Commission which respected natural boundaries and the geographic integrity of
jurisdictions, communities, and neighborhoods which would have yielded more competitive
districts.28 The newly approved maps were viewed as a vast improvement over the maps the

Lawsuit challenges Maryland’s newly passed legislative redistricting map, 2 ABC WMAR BALTIMORE (February
11, 2022, 6:50 PM), https://www.wmar2news.com/news/local-news/lawsuit-challenges-marylands-newly-passedlegislative-redistricting-map.
24 Alexa Corse, Maryland Judge Throws Out State’s Congressional Map , WSJ (March 25, 2022, 2:43 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/maryland-judge-throws-out-states-congressional-map-11648233798.
25 Meagan Flynn, Maryland Judge says she cannot approve congressional map unsigned by Hogan , THE
WASHINGTON POST (April 1, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/04/01/maryland-hogancongressional-map-gerrymandering/.
26 ‘Tremendous victory’: Hogan signs new congressional redistricting map into law after appeal dropped ,
WBALTV11 (April 4, 2022), https://www.wbaltv.com/article/maryland-congressional-redistricting-map-appealwithdrawn/39628879#.
27 Azi Paybarah, Gov. Larry Hogan Approves New Maryland Congressional Map , N. Y. TIMES (April 4, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/04/us/politics/maryland -redistricting-larry-hogan.html.
28 Id.
23
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Democrat controlled Maryland Legislature originally produced which a judge called an “extreme
gerrymander” and had thrown out.29
II.

Reform in Other States

Redistricting commissions are currently used in fourteen states as the primary means of
drawing legislative and congressional district maps. Missouri, Arkansas, New Jersey, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania use politician redistricting commissions.30 Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan, Montana and Washington use non-politician redistricting
commissions.31 Politician redistricting commissions are formed by a set number of politicians or
their designees to draw both legislative and congressional maps. 32 The number of politicians on
the commission varies per state. While politician commissions are not truly independent in that
they are not isolated from influence of elected officials, they are autonomous in their ability to
approve maps into law without approval of the legislature.33 Non-politician redistricting
commissions are made up of a group of citizens who submit applications to be selected for the
commission. The non-politician redistricting commissions focus on separation of the
commissioners from elected officials and the ability to put district lines in place without
legislative approval.34 These commissions oversee the drawing of legislative and congressional
maps. The approval process of these commission drawn maps varies per state.
The non-politician commissions used in California, Colorado and Michigan are focused
on below because they closely resemble the Maryland commission structure and have shown

29

Id.
REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS, https://ballotpedia.org/Redistricting_commissions (last visited 5/4/2022).
31 Id.
32 See Cain, supra note 16, at 1816.
33 Id.
34 See Cain, supra note 16, at 1817.
30

7

success in their implementation. This section will discuss the formation, map drawing/approval
process, results and criticisms of the independent redistricting commissions used in California,
Michigan, and Colorado.
a. California’s Independent Redistricting Commission
In 2008, California’s Proposition 11 was approved by California voters to amend the
California state Constitution to alter how districts were redrawn during the redistricting process.
Proposition 11 was the result of a 2008 ballot initiative to install an independent redistricting
commission in the state.35 A fourteen-person commission called the Citizens Redistricting
Commission now draws maps for both legislative and congressional districts. This fourteenperson commission is comprised of five Democrats, five Republicans and four independents.
Selecting its members involves a two-stage process.36 Applications are prescreened by the
California state auditor based on threshold requirements. All surviving applicants after
prescreening are invited to submit a supplemental application which is reviewed by an applicant
review panel. The panel selects 120 of the most qualified applicants in three sub pools of forty
Democrats, forty Republicans and forty independents. Then the panel narrows the pool down to
sixty of the most qualified applicants of which twenty are Democrats, twenty Republicans and
twenty independents. This list of sixty names is given to the state legislature where the Senate
and Assembly may each strike four applicants from each of the three pools of twenty. Thus,
allowing eight total strikes from each of the three pools, leaving twelve members in each pool.
Then the state auditor randomly selects eight members from the three pools to serve on the
commission. Finally, the eight members chosen by the state auditor are required to select the last

35
36

Rebecca Green, Redistricting Transparency, 59 WM. & M ARY L. REV. 1787, 1806-07 (2018).
CALIFORNIA COMMISSION SELECTION, https://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/commission/, (last visited April 9, 2022).
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six members from the remaining pool.37 These final six members consist of two applicants from
each of the three pools.38 The final commission totals five Democrats, five Republicans, and four
independent members.39
When maps are formed, the commission must take into account ranked criteria. Article
21 of the California Constitution lists the following redistricting criteria in order of priority:40
(1) Districts shall comply with the United States Constitution.41
(2) Districts shall comply with the federal Voting Rights Act
(42 U.S.C. Sec. 1971 and following).42
(3) Districts shall be geographically contiguous. 43
(4) The geographic integrity of any city, county, city and county, local neighborhood, or
local community of interest shall be respected in a manner that minimizes their division to the
extent possible without violating the requirements of any of the preceding
subdivisions.44
(5) To the extent practicable, and where this does not conflict with the criteria above,
districts shall be drawn to encourage geographical compactness such that nearby areas of
population are not bypassed for more distant population.45

37

Id.
Id.
39 California State Auditor Randomly Draws the Names of First Eight Commissioners to Serve on the 2020 Citizens
Redistricting Commission, WE DRAW THE LINES CALIFORNIA (June 3, 2020),
https://www.wedrawthelinesca.org/names_of_first_eight_commissioners_to_serve_on_the_2020_citizens_redistricti
ng_commission.
40 See Ancheta , supra note 1, at 122-23.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
38
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(6) To the extent practicable, and where this does not conflict with the criteria above,
each Senate district shall be comprised of two whole, complete, and adjacent Assembly districts,
and each Board of Equalization district shall be comprised of 10 whole, complete, and adjacent
Senate districts.46
The remaining criteria reflect the priorities of California law in structuring districts.47
These additional criteria include contiguous districts, keeping cities, counties, neighborhoods and
communities of interest together as much as possible and geographic compactness. 48 The criteria
are ranked to help resolve conflicts among competing factors. The commission must abide by
these criteria when drawing maps.
The California commission was designed to promote transparency with the public
regarding how decisions are made.49 Before maps are drawn, the commission holds pre-map
input hearings around the state to receive input from the public. 50 In these meetings, citizens can
discuss key points of interest regarding their communities for the commission to consider. After
the hearings conclude, the commission draws first drafts of each map. Then input hearings on the
draft maps are held to get public input. After these meetings conclude, second drafts of the maps
are made addressing the public’s comments.51 Second meetings on the second draft maps are
then held shortly after for one final opportunity for public input. Final maps must then be drawn
and approved by the commission wherein three of the five Democrats, three of the five

46

Id.
Id.
48 Id.
49 See Green, supra note 36, at 1806.
50 C AL . C ONST . art. XXI, § 1-3.
51 Id.
47
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Republicans and three of the four independents must vote to approve the maps before they can be
adopted.52
The commission has overall satisfied expectations to produce districting plans that are
viewed as fair and neutral to each major party. Maps drawn by the commission are producing
more competitive districts over time compared to the legislature’s drawn maps.53 There are more
competitive districts which impact the ruling party in the state. This may indicate the
commission’s independent map outcomes have helped move the needle to more neutral
redistricting outcomes.54 The commission has closely adhered to constitutional criteria,
producing boundaries that were more compact and more competitive than the lines they have
replaced.55 Since the commission was created, it has largely succeeded in removing legislative
self-interest from the map-making equation.56 Partisanship was constrained by the structure of
the commission’s members and the map drawing process was opened up to the public for greater
public scrutiny and participation, resulting in maps that always complied with federal and state
requirements.57 In addition, comparisons of the commission’s maps with the previous legislative
maps have shown that the commission’s districts were generally more compact, more
competitive, better at advancing minority rights and more successful in maintaining cities,
counties and communities of interest.58

52

Id.
Eric McGhee, Assessing California’s Redistricting Commission: Effects on Partisan Fairness and
Competitiveness, PPIC (March 2018), https://www.ppic.org/publication/assessing-californias-redistrictingcommission-effects-on-partisan-fairness-and-competitiveness/.
54 Id.
55 See Cain, supra note 16, at 1827.
56 See Ancheta, supra note 1, at 110.
57 Id.
58 See Ancheta, supra note 1, at 136.
53
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Despite the success of the California commission, there were criticisms regarding ethnic
diversity in the application process used to select its members, especially in 2010.59 The
diversity of the applicant pool was brought into question when 74% of the voters who applied to
the commission were non-Hispanic white.60 However, once the fourteen commissioners were
selected, they identified as four Asian American members, three Hispanic members, three White
members, two African-American members, one Pacific Islander member and one American
Indian member.61 In addition, accusations of partisan influence during the public hearing process
have surfaced when political groups show up to the public hearings and testify as ordinary
citizens in support of configurations that coincide with the partisan interests of certain groups.62
However, it is important to note that legal and geographical restraints with fixed numbers of
single member districts create inevitable tradeoffs.63 One party is always going to argue that lines
could have been drawn better to empower its particular voters.64
b. Colorado’s Redistricting Commission
Colorado’s independent congressional and legislative redistricting commissions were
established by Amendments Y and Z to the state Constitution in 2018 to oversee the drawing of
Colorado’s congressional and state legislative district maps.65 The Amendments were given birth
when voters approved a ballot initiative to make the commissions a reality. These amendments
called for two separate commissions to be created. One commission was created to oversee the

59

California Citizens Redistricting Commission, BALLOTPEDIA (last visited April 9, 2022),
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Citizens_Redistricting_Commission .
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See Ancheta, supra note 1, at 110.
64 Id.
65 C OLORADO I NDEPENDENT R EDISTRICTING C OMMISSIONS, https://redistricting.colorado.gov/ (last visited April 9,
2022).
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drawing of legislative maps and a second commission was created to oversee the drawing of
congressional maps.66 Each commission is comprised of four Democrats, four Republicans and
four independent members. Each commission must include at least one member residing in each
current congressional district and at least one from the Western Slope. 67 Each commission must,
to the extent possible, reflect Colorado's racial, ethnic, gender, and geographic diversity. 68 The
member selection for each of the congressional and legislative commissions involves a separate
process, although each process consists of the same steps. Applications for commission seats are
submitted to a panel of three retired Colorado Supreme Court justices or appellate court judges
of different political parties.69 . The process begins with individuals applying via online
applications.70 Nonpartisan staff then make an initial applicant pool after reviewing the
applications and determining which candidates satisfy the qualifications.71 The judicial review
panel then randomly selects 300 Democrats, 300 Republicans, and 450 independent citizens from
the initial applicant pool to establish a selection pool of 1,050 people. 72 The judicial review panel
then reviews applications and narrows the pool down to fifty Democrats, fifty Republicans, and
fifty independents to establish a pool of 150 people. 73 The judicial panel then randomly selects
six commissioners consisting of two Democrats, two Republicans and two independents from the
150-person pool.74 Then four legislative leaders select ten applicants each from the initial
applicant pool and submit them to the judicial panel. 75 The judicial panel selects four

66

Id.
Id.
68 Id.
69 C OLORADO SELECTION PROCESS , https://redistricting.colorado.gov/content/commissioner-selection-process (last
visited April 9, 2022).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
67
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commissioners, one from each legislative leaders proposed applicants. 76 Finally, the judicial
panel selects two commissioners from the original pool of 450 randomly selected independent
citizens.77 The final selected commission must comprise four Democrats, four Republicans and
four independent members.
The criteria the commission must follow, when drawing districts, consist of:
(1) Districts shall abide by the Constitution of the United States.78
(2) Districts must comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965.79
(3) As much as possible, districts must preserve whole communities of interest and whole
political subdivisions, such as counties, cities and towns.80
(4) Districts must be as compact as reasonably possible.81
(5) The commission must maximize the number of competitive districts.82
During the map drawing process, the nonpartisan staff must first develop a preliminary
plan.83 This preliminary plan must be presented to the commission and published no earlier than
thirty days and no later than forty-five days after the commission has convened. 84 The
commission then holds public hearings throughout the state on the preliminary plan to receive
input from the public.85 At the conclusion of the public hearings, the nonpartisan staff must

76

Id.
Id.
78 C OLO. C ONST . art. V, § 48.1.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 C OLO. C ONST . art. V, § 44.4.
84 Id.
85 Id.
77
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consider the recommendations of the commission and the feedback from the public when
creating no less than three staff plans for the commission to consider.86 At this stage, the
commission can adopt a final plan from the plans submitted or request, in a public hearing, that
the nonpartisan staff create additional plans or amend the current plans. The final plan requires
approval of eight of the twelve commission members, including at least two independent
members.87 The final plan is then submitted to the Colorado Supreme Court for review.88 The
court must rule on these maps within one month of submission.89 If the court approves the maps,
they become law. If they reject the maps in whole or in part, the maps are returned to the
respective commission for revisions.90 The court must approve revised maps by the end of the
year.91 These maps are not subject to legislative approval, a governor’s veto, or veto referendum
petitions.92
Both legislative and congressional maps were approved by the Colorado Supreme Court
in 2021, with reactions to them being mixed amongst Colorado politicians.93 Independent
review of the new congressional and legislative maps by the Princeton Gerrymandering Project
gave Colorado’s new maps an “A” rating for promoting competitiveness and partisan fairness. 94

86

Id.
Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Colorado Amendment Y, Independent Commission for Congressional Redistricting Amendment (2018),
BALLOTPEDIA (last visited April 9, 2022),
https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Amendment_Y,_Independent_Commission_for_Congressional_Redistricting_Ame
ndment_(2018).
93 Gabrielle Franklin, Is Colorado’s latest redistricting map fair? Politicians are split on the answer, FOX 31
COLORADO (October 7, 2021), https://kdvr.com/news/politics/is-colorados-latest-redistricting-map-fair-the-answeris-partisan/.
94 David Meyers, What’s the status of redistricting in your state?, FULCRUM (March 7, 2022),
https://thefulcrum.us/Elections/Redistricting/whats-the-status-of-redistricting-in-your-state.
87
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c. Michigan’s Redistricting Commission
Michigan adopted an amendment to Article IV of the Michigan Constitution, establishing
an independent citizen redistricting commission to drawn both legislative and congressional
maps.95 Article IV was the result of a ballot initiative to create the commission and take sole
redistricting power away from the legislature. 96 The commission is comprised of four Democrats,
four Republicans and five independent members.97 The Secretary of State releases applications
to the public at the beginning of the year. Some are also mailed to 10,000 random registered
Michigan voters.98 The Secretary of State randomly selects thirty Democrats, thirty Republicans
and forty independents from the public submitted applications and thirty Democrats, thirty
Republicans and forty independents from the randomly mailed applications. 99 The legislative
leaders may strike five applicants each from any pool, up to a maximum of twenty strikes by the
four legislative leaders from the pool of 200 applicants.100 The Secretary of State randomly
selects four Democrats, four Republicans and five independent applicants from the remaining
pool of 180 applicants to serve as members of the commission. 101
The Michigan commission must draw maps according to the following criteria in order of
priority:

95

M ICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (13).
Court Declares Michigan Independent Redistricting Commission Constitutional , M ICHIGAN LEAGUE OF
CONSERVATION VOTERS (last visited April 9, 2022), https://michiganlcv.org/cases/court-declares-michiganindependent-redistricting-commission-constitutional/ .
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Michigan, ALL ABOUT R EDISTRICTING (last visited May 4, 2022),
https://redistricting.lls.edu/state/michigan/?cycle=2020&level=Congress&startdate=2021 -12-28.
100 Id.
101 Id.
96

16

(1) Districts shall be of equal population as mandated by the United States Constitution
and shall comply with the Voting Rights Act and other federal laws.102
(2) Districts shall be geographically contiguous. Island areas are considered to be
contiguous by land to the county of which they are a part. 103
(3) Districts shall reflect the state's diverse population and communities of interest.
Communities of interest may include, but shall not be limited to, populations that share cultural
or historical characteristics or economic interests. Communities of interest do not include
relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates. 104
(4) Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A
disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of
partisan fairness.105
(5) Districts shall not favor or disfavor an incumbent elected official or a candidate.106
(6) Districts shall reflect consideration of county, city, and township boundaries. 107
(7) Districts shall be reasonably compact.108

Once the maps are drawn, they must be open to the public for forty-five days to be
commented on. Adopting a map requires a majority vote of the commission including at least
two commissioners who affiliate with each major party. If no majority is reached, each
commissioner may submit one proposed plan for legislative districts and one proposed plan for
congressional districts to the full commission for consideration. Each commissioner ranks the

102

M ICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (13).
Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
103
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plans submitted according to preference. Each plan is assigned a point value. The commission
then adopts the plans with the highest point value. Within thirty days of adoption, all resources
used to create these plans must be published for public access. The commission’s approval
advances the maps into law.109
After both the congressional and legislative maps were approved by the commission in
2021, the Michigan commission’s work was met with positive feedback. According to
redistricting experts, the maps drawn by the commission were seen to be fairer and more neutral,
resulting in five competitive districts, compared to three competitive districts the year prior.110
However, not everyone was pleased with the commission’s maps. Three lawsuits were filed
alleging violations of the Voting Rights Act, partisan fairness and that the commission split local
municipalities in a way that violates the Michigan Constitution.111
III.

Improving Maryland’s Redistricting System

Redistricting commissions used in California, Colorado and Michigan have shown that
citizen-based commissions, whether overseeing the drawing of maps or drawing maps
themselves, produce fairer maps than do partisan legislatures. Governor Larry Hogan made an
attempt at creating a bipartisan commission with public hearings to draw congressional and
legislative maps for Maryland, but the state legislature ended up ignoring the commission and
drawing its own maps that benefited the state’s Democratic majority. Looking to the success
stories of California, Colorado and Michigan can guide Maryland in assessing which steps need

109

Id.
Jane Timm, Success stories: Michigan, Virginia adopt new maps after creating redistricting commissions, NBC
NEWS (December 30, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/success-stories-michigan-virginia-adoptnew-maps-after-creating-redistricting-n1286760.
111 Colin Jackson, One Michigan redistricting lawsuit down, two remain, M ICHIGAN R ADIO (February 4, 2022),
https://www.michiganradio.org/news/2022-02-04/one-michigan-redistricting-lawsuit-down-two-remain.
110
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to be taken to make an independent commission a focal point and stakeholder in the redistricting
process, so that the legislature cannot bypass the commission to draw its own partisan maps.
A. Failure of the Maryland System
The Maryland redistricting system, as written in the Maryland Constitution, gives the
legislature the last word on which legislative and congressional redistricting maps are put in
place. Since the Maryland General Assembly is controlled overwhelmingly by one political
party, this opens the door for Maryland to be highly susceptible to gerrymandering. Though
Governor Hogan proposed the independent commission, via executive order, to lead the state’s
congressional and legislative redistricting processes in 2021, his commission’s redistricting map
outcomes still needed to be approved by the Democrat-controlled legislature. There was no
mechanism in place to prevent the legislature from drawing its own partisan maps if it happened
to dislike the plans proposed by the commission. California, Colorado, and Michigan amended
their state Constitutions to include provisions that would give the independent commissions in
those states authority to remain an essential part of the map drawing process, regardless of what
the legislature thought, and thereby eliminated the legislature from having sole control over the
maps that were eventually approved in each state. Essentially, the current Maryland system
allows the state’s legislature to ignore the Maryland commission’s maps because it does not
mandate the commission’s participation in the process used to approve those maps.
B. How the Maps are Approved
The redistricting commissions used in California, Colorado and Michigan focus on
transparency, partisan equality, and public input. Each commission is designed to open up the
map drawing process to empower citizens to make redistricting decisions by creating structures
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that ensure citizen participation and that limit decisions made outside the public view. 112
Participation and transparency help drive a democratic process by providing a check on the selfinterest of each state’s dominant party, and this can help produce better maps.113
The Constitutions of California, Colorado, and Michigan provide legal guardrails that
require their independent redistricting commissions to participate in the map drawing process in
each state from start to finish. In California and Michigan, the state Constitution empowers the
state’s independent redistricting commissions to have sole authority in drafting the maps, taking
criticism into consideration, and ultimately voting on the maps in-house before they become law.
Colorado requires the commission to draw the maps to be submitted to the Colorado Supreme
Court for final approval. If the Colorado Supreme Court does not approve the maps, they are sent
back to the commission with notes attached for revision.
C. Where We Go from Here
The independent redistricting commissions examined thus far have provided a valuable
framework for what redistricting reform should look like. However, any reform must be adapted
to meet the priorities of the jurisdiction and the politics of the state. 114 Planning redistricting
reform is thus a function of two key factors: (1) defining the mechanism and goals of reform, and
(2) assessing the legal and political landscape to define the best path towards reform. 115
Depending on what pushback comes from the current Maryland legislature, the path to reform
could take one of two avenues: (i) aggressive reform or (ii) intermediate reform.
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i.

Aggressive reform

The key point we see in the success of the California, Colorado, and Michigan
independent citizen redistricting commissions is they each contain a mechanism for the
commission-drawn maps to be put into law. In both California and Michigan, the commission
has the final say over which maps are adopted as law. This is critical because it takes the
legislature out of the redistricting process completely. The commission draws the maps, then
issues the maps, which then become law. This mechanism is derived from the amendments to the
state Constitutions dictating what powers these states’ redistricting commissions have. In
Colorado, the Colorado state Constitution lays out a slightly different approach of requiring the
Colorado Supreme Court to have the final say on the redistricting maps before they are put into
law. However, the state Supreme Court cannot simply reject the maps provided by the
commission and replace them with its own. The state Supreme Court must send the maps it does
not approve back to the commission with comments and then must allow the commission to
revise its maps for resubmission. This process keeps the main map drawing power primarily with
the independent bipartisan commission and away from the partisan legislature. More
importantly, it keeps the commission in the process of map drawing and helps to open the door to
better communication regarding how better maps should be drawn.116 To have a similar impact
on Maryland’s redistricting process, there needs to be a process set forth in the Maryland
Constitution that requires the state’s redistricting commission to maintain map drawing control.
The shift from a legislative-run redistricting process to an independent redistricting
commission in California, Colorado and Michigan stemmed from a ballot initiative in each state
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that was approved by the state’s citizens in order to introduce a constitutional amendment to
dictate the formation, qualifications, and duties of an independent redistricting commission that
would oversee each state’s redistricting process. Maryland currently only uses ballot initiatives
for veto referendums, which provides the only access the state’s citizens have to any form of
initiated statewide direct democracy. 117 This veto referendum enables Maryland citizens to force
a statewide popular vote on laws that have been passed by the legislature.118
An amendment to the Maryland state Constitution can be proposed and put on the ballot
by a legislative referral or by a constitutional convention.119 When a bill is proposed in the
General Assembly by a legislator, the General Assembly votes on the bill. 120 The bill needs a
three-fifths majority in the House and in the Senate in just one legislative session to move
forward. After an amendment receives a three-fifths majority, it goes directly to referendum in
the next general election and is then to be voted on by Maryland’s voters.121 A majority of voters
must vote “yes” for it to pass. According to Section 2 of Article XIV of the Maryland
Constitution, a question as to whether to hold a Constitutional Convention is automatically
placed on the statewide general election ballot every twenty years.122 To win approval, the
number of people voting “yes” must be over 50% of the total number of voters who vote
overall.123 Any proposed amendments resulting from the convention must be voted on by
Maryland’s citizens wherein a majority is needed to pass. With only two avenues to amending
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the Maryland Constitution, the best choice would likely be gathering support within the
legislature to propose an amendment implementing an independent redistricting commission into
Maryland’s law. Success with legislative referrals have been seen in Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, and
Virginia in pushing for state constitutional amendments for independent redistricting
commissions.124
Another option worth pursuing if the independent citizen redistricting commission is not
an option is implementing a well-balanced politician redistricting commission to lead the map
drawing process. This serves as a compromise if stripping politicians out of the redrawing
process is too difficult for a state legislature to accept. These politician commissions can serve as
an alternative to taking sole power of approving maps away from the legislature and instead
introduce a more balanced system. A well-designed politician commission can be a valid reform
alternative.125 The premise of a political commission is that redistricting is a political enterprise
that ideally leads to bargained compromise between stakeholders. 126 New Jersey uses a similar
politician redistricting commission which consists of equally sized contingents of Democrats and
Republican appointees chaired with a tiebreaking member selected by the commissioners
themselves or by the state Supreme Court if the commissioners cannot agree on a candidate. 127
New Jersey uses separate political commissions for drawing congressional and legislative
maps.128 The congressional commission consists of twelve members who are appointed by the
two majority and two minority party leaders plus the two chairs of the state Democratic and
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Republican parties, each of whom get two selections. 129 The thirteenth tiebreaking member is
selected by the twelve commission members or by the state Supreme Court in the event of a
stalemate.130 The tiebreaker is restricted from having held political office in New Jersey for the
last five years.131 The legislative commission are selected by the two state party chairs who get
five appointments each.132 The eleventh tiebreaking commission member is selected by the other
ten members or by the state Supreme Court in the event of a stalemate.133 Both the legislative
and congressional commissions must adopt the map which receives a majority vote.
This New Jersey political commission model requires the two-party delegations of each
commission to submit competing plans that address state specific goals including creating
competitive seats, minimalizing party bias, and retaining voters in the same districts to the degree
possible.134 This should promote competition for the tiebreaking vote and lead to maps that better
adhere to the state goals.135 Similar to the California, Colorado and Michigan redistricting
commissions, the power granted to the New Jersey commissions is given by the New Jersey state
Constitution. To implement a similar system in Maryland, the state Constitution would need to
be amended via legislative backing or Constitutional Convention to ensure the politician
commission was a focal point in the map drawing and approval process and ensure the
legislature cannot bypass the commission.
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ii.

Intermediate reform

In areas where the legislative body is unlikely to give up control of the process and there
are no direct democracy mechanisms to work around the legislature, reform towards an
independent commission may be impossible.136 In these cases, intermediate reform is a better
path forward because it is less threatening to legislative powers.137 This intermediate reform
could consist of the passing of law to require open meetings and mandate a minimum of public
hearings for public input.138 These reform efforts still provide significant checks on incumbency
and gerrymandering by opening the redistricting process to the public eye, thus making it harder
for the ruling party to justify unfair maps. Such reform is more incremental and likely more
appealing for a partisan legislature to adopt. In addition, opening the door into the map drawing
process can gather steam and further support for reform down the road.
IV.

Conclusion: Final Thoughts

Redistricting reform efforts for Maryland will likely be an uphill battle. However,
looking to how other states have achieved reform can be a useful tool to move Maryland toward
having a redistricting process that is fairer. Independent redistricting commissions have been
shown to be effective by providing more visibility and bipartisan participation in the redistricting
process, yielding more neutral outcomes. They also generally result in less litigation. To see the
same effects in Maryland, the Maryland Constitution must be amended to take the power to draw
districts away from politicians/legislators and give it to ordinary state citizens through a
bipartisan independent redistricting commission. California, Colorado, and Michigan share this
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mechanism in that they have put legal guardrails into their respective state Constitutions that
either give their redistricting commissions sole power in approving their state maps or facilitate
that rejected maps are returned to the independent commission after comments are provided by
the state’s Supreme Court, so that the maps can be revised and resubmitted by the commission.
In California, Colorado, and Michigan, after state Constitutions were amended to give
redistricting commissions discrete authority to make them essential players and stakeholders in
the redistricting process, we have seen the partisan influence of politicians and state legislatures
diminish and more neutral redistricting outcomes take hold.
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